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Preface
Throughout the paper, I have used the Netherlands and Holland interchangeably. This
is somewhat historically inaccurate, as Holland only refers to two provinces, North Holland
and South Holland (Noord and Zuid). I have left many terms and phrases in Dutch, using
modern spelling. Phrases in Malay, the language of the Moluccans, are mostly spelled using
modern Indonesian Malay, which is not always the same as the dialect used in the Moluccan
community here in the Netherlands. The exceptions to this are Moluccan names and Dutch
Moluccan institutions. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, I use “Ambonese” to refer to
some of the Dutch citizens. This refers to the island of Ambon, where most of the refugees to
the Netherlands came from and was the preferred term for the immigrant group during the
1950s and 1960s. The Dutch government officially switched from using “Ambonese” in the
late 1960s, opting for the more inclusive Moluccan moniker. It is important to note that while
all Ambonese are Moluccan, not all Moluccans are Ambonese.
I want to thank the many people who helped me along the way in writing and researching
this paper. A great debt of gratitude is owed to my advisor, Professor Karel Steenbrink, for
patiently working with me and sharing with me a great deal of knowledge. I would like to
thank Omar Nahas, my academic director, for always giving me perspective about this paper
and reminding me to stay calm, composed and focused. I would like to thank the Maluku
Museum in Utrecht and specifically its director, Wim Manuhutu, for graciously opening the
doors of the institution to my research and allowing me to poke around in all the corners of
this beautiful and important museum. Special thanks also go to Professor Hans van
Amersfoort and Joss Wibisono for taking the time to meet with me and for adding many
different angles to my research. I also want to thank the eight fellow students on this SIT trip.
They kept me motivated and became important friends to me. Because of each and every one
of them, this semester has been unforgettable and an incredibly important chapter of my life.
Lastly, I want to thank and dedicate this paper to my grandfather, my Opar, Reinout van
Wagtendonk. It is not easy to share ones life story or open up old chapters that are emotional
and complicated. I am thrilled that I was able to explore his story with familial and academic
context built around it and I have become more aware about myself and my family through
work with my grandfather.
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Jamie van Wagtendonk
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Introduction: Studying the Past to Learn for the Future
The Netherlands has undergone a stark transformation since the Second World War.
Left in physical, economic and cultural ruin after the devastating conflict, the Netherlands
has been rebuilt and rejuvenated, emerging as an economically strong and nationally vibrant
western European country and serving as a cornerstone nation for the construction of the
European Union in this second half of the 20th century. Intertwined with this phoenix-like
resurrection of the Netherlands is the story of immigration in Europe. The Continental
Netherlands was an ethnically homogenous society before the war. While there were small
pockets of non-indigenous people living in the Netherlands along with religious minorities,
including a Jewish population that was decimated during the war, there was an almost
complete lack of non-western cultural diversity in the Netherlands. However, through a series
of world events and economic needs, this has rapidly changed. Today, it is estimated that
almost twenty percent of Dutch citizens have a foreign background and that, out of the over
three million people classified this way, more than one and a half million have a “nonwestern” background. 1 The societal fabric of the Netherlands has been rewoven during its
rapid transformation into a multicultural, diverse country. The newspapers are filled with
articles and statistics about the increasing population of immigrants. Bruising political battles
are being waged over the influx of different cultures, different religions and foreign
languages. The country often seems unable or ill equipped to solve the problems and
conflicts that have risen out of the hastily created Dutch melting pot, a sudden diversity that
has caught many indigenous Dutch by surprise. Holland is a small, densely populated
country and tensions are magnified here. It is this incredible speed at which cultures have
collided and rubbed against each other in Holland that has caused many of the problems that
show up in today’s newspapers.
In order to slow down the discussion, avoid some of the hysteria emerging from many
different sides, and to delve into the complexity and nuances of the immigration issues, I
believe it is essential to explore some recent history of the Netherlands and focus on one of
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its first immigrant groups. The non-western migrants who came from Indonesia at the end of
World War II, specifically the Moluccans, went through many of the problems, struggles,
misconceptions and acts of intolerance that are occurring today with immigrants mainly from
Turkey and Morocco. These former subjects of the Dutch Indonesian colony have in many
ways managed to become accepted in Dutch society, despite their cultural and ethnic
differences. The Dutch and all students of immigration issues can learn from the history of
this group of people and can, in studying the past, solve problems more effectively in the
future. The study of immigration history in the Netherlands and in the other former colonial
powers is “Janus-faced”, according to French Islamist scholar Jacques Berque. 2 This image
of the two-faced Roman god, always looking backwards and forwards alludes to the
importance of history in shaping the future. The most important task is to see “the shadows
thrown by the past on the present and future” and escape from these shadows. 3 It is
imperative that there be a concerted effort to apply lessons learned from the Moluccan
Diaspora experience in the Netherlands in order to move forward and proactively solve
contemporary immigration issues.
The Moluccan experience is quite distant from that of the Moroccans and Turks who
came to the Netherlands beginning in the 1970s. The Moluccans were an essentially finite
group, drawn from the ranks of the Dutch colonial army and, along with their family, forced
by political circumstances to move to the Netherlands. These 12,578 Moluccans arrived in
1951, hoping to return to an independent homeland in the Moluccas, but destined to settle
and eventually build families in their new home. 4 They were political exiles, in a sense,
longing and, in many instances, fighting for their homeland in what is now Indonesia.
Therefore, many of the problems of integration and cultural tension between the Moluccans
and their indigenous Dutch neighbors were partly due to external political strife and not, as is
often the case today, solely due to internal cultural differences. After all, many of the first
generation Moluccans were fluent or at least somewhat learned in Dutch upon their arrival,
having picked it up in the army. Most had received at least a basic Dutch colonial education
and many felt socially connected to Dutch colonial culture. The second wave of migrants to
2
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the Netherlands, consisting of guest workers (in Dutch, gastarbeiders) mostly from Turkey
and Morocco, began arriving in the 1970s and were mostly in search of a better life. They
were recruited by Dutch companies and by the Dutch government to fill the employment
void that was created during a time of Dutch economic growth and so many came from rural
areas with little or no formal education and certainly no cultural ties with the Netherlands or
even rudimentary Dutch language skills. This group has also led to the first large Islamic
population in the Netherlands. Though a very small segment of the Moluccan population in
the Netherlands is Muslim, the guest workers and their descendants constitute a much larger
group in the Islamic faith. Therefore, religion has also taken a central role, certainly since the
early 1990s, in the discussion about modern day immigrants in the Netherlands. Islam and,
unfortunately alongside it, the idea of radicalism, is part of the constant debate about
immigration law. The majority of Moluccans came with a hybridized Christian religion,
which fit more easily into the religious tapestry of the Netherlands. Thus, because of all these
differences, it is impossible to directly equate the Moluccan experience with that which is
embroiling the Netherlands today.
In the study of history, however, differences are often not the most important tools of
study. In learning from the past, I have found that the similarities are more important.
Interestingly, there are quite a few striking parallels between the evolution of the Moluccan
community in the Netherlands and the current search for a balance between the many
cultures living in the Netherlands and this has yet to be fully explored in contemporary
debates. The parallels can be especially seen in the physical and mental isolation of the
Moluccan community, the colonial mindset that has tinged Dutch society’s relationship with
the newcomers, and the radicalization and subsequent violent actions of the second
generation in the Netherlands. It is through these similarities, weaving its way through the
complex history of colonialism, Indonesian independence and subsequent Moluccan
immigration, repatriation of Eurasians in the Netherlands and the deep struggle of the
Moluccan community to find a home and establish roots, that one can learn. By following
this timeline under the surface, learning from the nuances of multiculturalism and struggling
with the complexity of cultural coexistence, one can begin to affect real change upon the
problems of today and the future.
Isolation: From Japanese POW camps to Dutch housing camps

6

There must have been a great swell of ambivalent feelings for the Moluccan refugees
as the Kota Inten slowly steamed into the Rotterdam port on March 21, 1951. 5 Photos show
young Dutch soldiers hurriedly guiding the new arrivals off the ship, some carrying
Moluccan children under the careful eye of their mother and followed by their fathers, many
still in their army uniform. It had been almost a month since the rickety old boat, originally
built in 1927 and frequently used during Dutch colonial times as a transport for Muslim
Indonesians to travel to Mecca for the hajj, left the port of Surabaya, an important coastal city
on the island of Java where the Moluccan soldiers had been stationed prior to the
establishment of the newly independent Indonesian republic on August 17, 1950. 6 Finally,
this first small contingent of Moluccan soldiers and their families could see land again and
did not have to worry if the rust-covered, antiquated transport ship would survive the voyage
almost all the way around the world. However, the landscape that welcomed them was unlike
anything they had ever seen. Their first view of Holland, appearing over the bow of the ship,
was the wasteland of post-World War Two Rotterdam. Most of the city had been flattened
during the war and outside this port, the country’s infrastructure had been devastated, much
of the countryside flooded by Allied bombs or Nazi sabotage. The Netherlands lacked the
economic resources to financially aid its own citizens, much less the newly arriving colonial
subjects. It was, for most, not a joyful arrival. The Moluccans had not wanted to leave their
homeland, nor had they desired to watch the Moluccan islands become part of the Indonesian
republic, but after Sukarno, the new leader of Indonesia had successfully and, in the eyes of
the mainly Christian soldiers, violently quashed the rebellion in these islands, the Dutch
government had no choice but to bring home its soldiers. For the next year, the Moluccan
remnants of the Dutch colonial army, comprised of a diverse group of soldiers from various
islands and backgrounds, would make the long and arduous journey from the archipelago
formerly known as the Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands. This group, along with other
Moluccan political refugees, came to constitute the first concentrated immigrant group
entering the Netherlands and established a strong Diaspora community here, albeit one that is
remarkably heterogeneous and distinct in its makeup.

5
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One of the greatest problems that faced the Moluccans in the Netherlands and one
that was created both by the policies of the government and by the, in retrospect, unrealistic
beliefs by the community leaders, was an isolation from the general Dutch population. The
Moluccan men who arrived in 1951 were, almost without exception, members of the KNIL,
the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger or the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army. 7 Many
of these men had fought against the Japanese in the early 1940s when the latter took over the
Dutch colony during its Pacific conquest. They had suffered the consequences along with
their ethnically Dutch comrades, sentenced to years of hard labor in the Japanese prisoner of
war camps. While some Indonesians from other parts of the massive archipelago worked or
were impressed to fight 8 with the Japanese against the joint Dutch and Australian army in the
Dutch East Indies, a great number of Moluccans joined in the fight with their colonial
sovereign against these Indonesian nationalists. However, when the soldiers and their
families arrived on the shores of the Netherlands, they were immediately discharged from the
army “in the form of a stenciled slip of paper.” 9 The Netherlands, still reeling from the
destruction of World War Two seemingly did not know what to do with the new arrivals. The
Dutch government finally set about hastily preparing camps around the country that would
serve as a “temporary” home for the Moluccans before they were repatriated to their homes
in the Moluccas. 10 The Dutch government continuously proclaimed that it had never intended
for the Indonesians to stay in the country and “maintained that they would be returned to
Indonesia as soon as possible.” 11 The sixty camps, spread out throughout the country and
often well removed from Dutch cities and towns, were the welcome for the Moluccans in the
Netherlands. These drab refugee camps, often in a great deal of disrepair, and including two
former Nazi concentration camps, were the physical manifestation of the Dutch
governmental policy that served to isolate the Moluccans from the indigenous Dutch and the
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painfully slow movement to rectify this isolation set back any hope of true integration for
decades. 12
When the Japanese army finally took over the Dutch East Indies in early 1942, it set
up a string of camps spread out across the thousands of Indonesian islands to house prisoners
of war and the Dutch civilian population. Conditions were terrible and as the war continued,
these prisoners were faced with grueling work loads, little medical care, malnourishment and
eventually, the famed and terrible “death marches.” Many Ambonese soldiers who had
fought under ethnically Dutch commanders against the Japanese were placed in these camps
as well. The Moluccan community suffered heavily under Japanese rule. Entire families were
killed for possessing Dutch language books or pictures of Queen Wilhelmina and many more
were forcibly moved from their village so that the Japanese authorities could control the
population better. 13 For the KNIL soldiers who arrived in the Netherlands in 1951, it
immediately appeared to them, in a tragic irony, that the Dutch were placing them right back
into the same camp situation that they had recently been released from. While the Dutch
government did provide a great deal of services for these camps, the restriction of movement,
the separation from other Moluccans in the Netherlands and inability to interact with the rest
of Dutch society must have felt painfully reminiscent of the four-year Japanese occupation.
Aerial views of Japanese prisoner of war camps look eerily similar to Westerbork and Vught,
the two former Nazi concentration camps that were used to house some of the Moluccan
soldiers and their families. 14 Upon arriving in this new situation, anger began to grow in the
Moluccan community. The soldiers were enraged by what they perceived as a betrayal by the
government they had fought for and suffered for. The Moluccans felt “sold out” and this
seething resentment of the Dutch government established many of the problems in this and
future Moluccan generations in the Netherlands. 15
In his doctoral dissertation written in 1955, Tamme Wittermans goes to great lengths
to describe the situation of the Ambonese soldiers and their families in the Netherlands.
Formerly a Dutch teacher in Batavia on the island of Java in the Dutch East Indies,
12
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Wittermans survived the war and became interested in the Moluccan community during his
brief stint in the Royal Dutch Air Force. Part of his dissertation gives a historically relevant
and intriguing picture of camp life for the Moluccans. This description shows two sides of
the isolation that the Moluccans experienced in the Netherlands. On the one hand, they had
the ability to keep their culture intact and there was very little interference in this. However,
ultimately, the Moluccans had essentially no control over their lives in the Netherlands.

Camp Schattenberg is a pre-war army camp, situated at the end of a secondary road
and surrounded by heath and woodland. The nearest Dutch village is three miles, the
nearest provincial town, fourteen miles away…The built-up area of approximately
75 acres is surrounded by a fence. A few buildings have been converted into a
church, a mosque, a hospital, a school, a shop and a canteen…The offices of the
Dutch administration, a post office, and a registrar’s office are on the road just
outside the fence. Financial affairs, supply and preparation of the daily meals of the
population, accommodation, travel and transfer, all are in Dutch hands. 16

There was a reason for the initial housing situation. Both the Dutch government and
the Moluccan leaders in exile believed that their stay in the Netherlands was temporary. The
migration of the ex-soldiers was only to protect them in the short term, but both sides hoped
and, in many ways, unrealistically wished that a political solution could be found in
Indonesia that would allow the Moluccans to return to an independent Moluccan nation. This
mentality benefited the Dutch government in the short-term, but ultimately led to the greatest
failure towards the Moluccan community. By essentially letting time run its course and
hoping that a political solution would drop out of the proverbial sky, the Dutch government
could ignore the plight of the Moluccans in the country. They did not have to provide
permanent housing, jobs or real education to the migrants because this group of people was,
in the bullheaded view of the Dutch government, destined to leave after a few years. There
was no need for them to integrate or become part of Dutch society because, in essence, they
already had a home waiting fro them. This, according to Professor Hans van Amersfoort, was

16
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one of the great mistakes of the Dutch government in terms of the Moluccan history in the
Netherlands and one that is repeated itself somewhat with the Islamic immigrants of today.
With both groups, the initial understanding was that the immigrants were only temporary.
Tongue in cheek, van Amersfoort, a professor in the University of Amsterdam Institute for
Migration and Ethnic Studies, notes that when “politicians find an immigration problem
difficult, they postpone the solution.” 17
This is exactly what the Dutch government did. In setting up the Commissariaat
Ambonezenzorg, the Directorate for Ambonese Welfare, the Dutch government’s sole goal
for this immigrant group was to take care of them for as little time as possible and then ship
them back to the Moluccas. 18 There was even a fear in the Dutch government about the
minority group. Even though they had been trained by the Dutch military, it bothered some
government officials to have so many militarily trained “foreigners” in the country. One
member of the Commissariaat even remarked that “the Dutch Colonial Army was nothing,
but a band of outlaws and hoodlums.” 19 It is not surprising, therefore, that it took the Dutch
government a painfully long time to realize that these new residents in the Netherlands were
there to stay. This pause, while allowing politicians in the 1950s and 1960s to skirt the issue
of Moluccan integration, also created a greater split in between the Moluccan community and
its Dutch neighbors and eventually led to a great eruption of anger and violence in years to
come.
Republik Maluku Selatan
For a while, however, this idea of separation was not only a governmental policy. It
was also a preferred situation for many Moluccan leaders. Because the Moluccan community
was a diverse one, the split amongst camps throughout the Netherlands was not always
regarded as a negative one. It was similar, in some ways, to the system of villages back in the
Moluccas. However, apart from what Professor van Amersfoort describes as the usual desire
for immigrant groups to form “some sort of enclave culture”, the political makeup of the
Moluccan immigrants in the Netherlands played a strong role in the self-isolation from the
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rest of Dutch society. 20 Nationalistic sentiments ran high in most Moluccan communities in
this first generation of the 1950s and 1960s. The Republik Maluku Selatan, the RMS, had
been declared independent on April 26, 1950. Quickly thereafter, the tiny nation had been, in
the eyes of the mostly Christian independence movement, invaded and violently absorbed by
the Sukarno-led Indonesian government. The Moluccans in the Netherlands, however,
believed that one day the RMS would regain its independence and would provide them a
home back in the Moluccas. This belief was held quite strongly by the first generation in the
Netherlands and many Moluccan communities would shun anyone who would suggest
compromising with the Indonesian government or working together with the Dutch society to
make the Moluccan presence permanent. Early leaders of the Moluccans in exile “had a great
fear that people would emancipate” and so they used nationalistic rhetoric to strengthen
isolationist sentiments in the group. 21 Therefore, similar to the guest-workers from Morocco
in the 1970s, this immigrant community had “an illusion” that they would return home. 22
One Moluccan immigrant described buying new kitchenware in the Netherlands and then
boxing it up and writing her address in the Moluccas on it. “We left everything packed up.
After all, we were going back in a year’s time.” 23
Thus, it was not only the Dutch government who failed to foresee the permanence of
the Moluccans in the Netherlands. This pervading hope of return was used by Moluccan
leaders to discourage interaction with Dutch society and certainly was used to glorify and
amplify ethnic roots and heritage. This meant, however, that the Moluccans were in a
constant “state of suspension.” There was no permanence, either in the physical living
situation or the in the mental conception of the Moluccan Diaspora. The Moluccans were
statenloos, stateless. 24 This meant that the Moluccans were, at once, completely dependent
on the Dutch government, especially economically, but at the same time, constantly
struggling to remain independent from Dutch cultural influences. 25 The economic
dependence also had deep rooted consequences for the future of the Moluccans in the
Netherlands. Men who had previously served with a great deal of pride in the army were
20
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reduced to working in the few local and often menial jobs in the camps. They could not take
pride in providing for their families because the Moluccan camp life was one of forced
welfare. All food and clothing were subsidized and gas, electricity and water were free.26
This may seem positive, but it fostered a sense amongst the first generation of economic
impotence.
Not all Moluccan first-generation immigrants rejected interaction with their new
Dutch neighbors in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of the younger soldiers, especially those who
had bad experiences back in the Moluccans were excited to visit the country of their Dutch
officers and see a new part of the world. One young soldier, in an interview forty-five years
after his arrival on the shores of the Netherlands, recalls this exuberance, beginning on the
ship to Rotterdam. “I found everything exciting. I was only nineteen.” 27 He remembers being
speechless as white snowflakes started to fall from the sky, covering the ground with a
“white surface” that he had never seen before. 28 Alongside some of the other bachelors of the
KNIL army unit who were all housed in the Fledder camp in Drenthe, he explored the small
town of Norg. There, the Dutch villagers were so surprised to see what the Ambonese soldier
jokingly described as “an army from another planet”, that the customers in a bakery “hid
behind the counter.” 29 Thus, while this young man still believed at the time that he would
only stay in the Netherlands for “five years” and then return to an independent RMS, he and
many of his comrades wanted to “get acquainted with the local community.” 30 So, from the
beginning, they shared their Ambonese culture with the Dutch locals by singing songs and
giving performances, while at the same time, adopting some Dutch culture. He even learned
to eat “soepm’brei”, an old-fashioned name for a traditional Dutch rice pudding, something
that this soldier proudly remembers as his first introduction to his new country’s cuisine. 31
However, at least at the beginning, this experience was mostly an exception to the norm as
many Moluccan first-generation migrants treated their Dutch home and their Dutch
neighbors as temporary.
Separated and Dependent: The Moluccan Wards
26
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Today in the big cities of the Netherlands, there are certain neighborhoods known for
their ethnic composition. Walking through Slotermeer in Amsterdam, Lombok or Kanalen
Eiland Zuid in Utrecht or Delphaven in Rotterdam, one notices an increase in Arabic on the
signs in shops and small store-front mosques appear nearby the usual Dutch Calvinist
churches. These neighborhoods are majority Islamic areas in the Netherlands, often
derogatorily labeled as ghettos and seen by some as places to avoid. Through a combination
of government policy, housing zoning and desire by immigrant groups to stick together, these
semi-segregated neighborhoods represent the modern physical representation of ethnic
separation. In a country that frequently discusses the fate of zwarte scholen, literally
translated as black schools and referring to schools which have a majority of students from
non-western foreign backgrounds, there is a struggle in the political and societal realm as to
how physically integrated those with a foreign background should be with the indigenous
Dutch population. It is important to note that this is not an original debate. It was held on a
much smaller scale with the Moluccan population in the Netherlands. By the time the Dutch
government came around to the idea that the Moluccan immigrants were here to stay, they
decided to abandon the temporary camps and offer permanent housing in Dutch cities and
towns. 32 However, due to opinions that also have contributed heavily to the current urban
segregation of ethnicities in the major Dutch cities, the Dutch government decided that the
Moluccan immigrants should have their own wards.
Beginning in the 1960s, the Moluccan housing camps throughout Holland were
slowly shut down. Sixty-five Moluccan wards, controlled, organized and subsidized until the
early 1980s by the Dutch government, were built around the country. 33 Consisting of
assigned streets, often, notably, on the outskirts of a town or city, the original governmental
plan called for all wards to be uniform, and, at the outset, they were supposed to have fifty
houses designated for Moluccan families. However, due to local government opposition and
the diversity of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, this regulation quickly fell by the wayside
as certain wards swelled in size quickly while others shrank below the fifty house quota. 34
The idea behind the ward system, was two-fold and it is these ideas that form another
32
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important problem with the integration of the Moluccans in the Netherlands. As the Dutch
government could see no resolution to the Moluccan independence movement in Indonesia in
the near future, they realized that the Moluccans should live in permanent houses. However,
in one of the most important and detrimental opinions about this first major immigrant group,
the Dutch government decided for the Moluccan community that they should live separately.
The Dutch government felt that it knew that the Moluccans were not ready to live side by
side with indigenous Dutch families, that “the rift between Moluccans and Dutch was still
too big in order for them…to bridge the gap individually” and so “people were housed in
groups.” 35 The Moluccans, for the most part, were not allowed, even after ten years in the
Netherlands, to determine their own living situation.
The differences in the ward system further diversified the experience of Moluccans in
the Netherlands. Some of the wards were located in small towns, ensuring that Moluccans
would immediately constitute a large percentage of the population there and, in many cases,
cause resentment amongst the original population. Still others were isolated from old
neighbors and friends in new wards spread out through the country. School tended to be a
place where either the classroom was filled with ethnically Moluccan children or contained
only a few, far outnumbered by their ethnically Dutch classmates. This seemingly arbitrary
spreading out of the population, which disrupted friendships and forced relocation to distant
reaches of the country created more resentment and angst in the first and the second
generation. 36 Thus, the isolation of the Moluccans continued in the wards, similarly to the
ostracism in the camps, and ensured that, at once, the Moluccan community would have to
rely on itself for support and communal ties, while still needing governmental economic
support. Almost without exception, the Moluccans continued to live at the whim of the Dutch
state with limited opportunities for upward financial and educational mobility. 37
It is this mindset, the way of thinking that institutionalized the problem of isolation,
which has contributed a great deal to the problems of integration in the Moluccan community
in the Netherlands. The Dutch mindset, one built in the colonial, western model, presumed to
know what was best for the Moluccan community. This “old patriarchical” relationship
between the government and the immigrant group served to damage hopes of integration for
35
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many years to come. 38 In the end, the isolation was the initial foundation of the problems
faced by the Moluccans in the Netherlands and it helped create a great deal of anger and
resentment that boiled over in acts of violence and terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s.
However, it was the Dutch mindset, forged by acting as a colonial power in the Dutch East
Indies, that truly ostracized the immigrants from their new home and ensured that there was a
lack of true understanding between the Dutch government and the Moluccan people living in
the Netherlands for a long period of time.
The Colonial Mindset: Tolerance and Paternalism
The Netherlands owned the Moluccan Islands and the rest of the East Indies for
almost three hundred and fifty years. For this period of time, a small minority of Dutchmen
living in the colony ruled the lives of their Indonesian colonial subjects, utilizing both
benevolent and violent, oppressive tactics to do so. Strict scholars of post-colonial theory
argue that this relationship, repeated by most western nations in what is today known as the
third world, ensured a certain level of European superiority in modern political and cultural
philosophies. After all, the Europeans were the ones to explore the non-western world and, to
a certain extent, successfully rule it for a long period of time. Without overstating the mark of
colonialism on modern Europe, this period of history set up a dichotomy between the east
and the west. Since the Europeans, and in the case of the Moluccans, the Dutch, had an upper
hand in the relationship, it makes sense that a certain level of beliefs of western superiority
would develop. The colonizing Europeans, correctly and incorrectly, perceived their
civilization to have progressed further than the non-western world and so, in actions both
benevolent and paternalistic, opportunistic and gracious, sought to grant the non-western
world the cultural practices that had come to be essential in European life. Unfortunately, in
some ways, this desire to deliver European culture to foreign groups of people has seeped
into the 20th century debate about immigration in the Netherlands. Though the Moluccans
served with distinction in the Dutch colonial army, they were still different from their Dutch
superior officers. Of course, in the army, they were also in lower ranks than their ethnically
Dutch counterparts.
Once the group arrived in the Netherlands, there was also a constant sense of
“otherness”. It would be a simplification to say that the problems faced in the integration of
38
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the Moluccans was mostly due to the colonial past. The initial issues were due almost
exclusively to outside political problems. The Moluccan stay was supposed to be temporary
and so, correctly, Professor van Amersfoort, among other Dutch scholars of immigration, is
hesitant to connect the Moluccan experience to post-colonial sentiments. 39 However, despite
the concrete political issues which shaped most of the Moluccan immigration paradigm here,
it is a mistake to completely discount the underlying feelings that the Dutch and most other
European countries had for groups of immigrants coming from third world nations. In the
1951 immigration of the Moluccans, the Dutch saw, essentially for the first time in its
modern history, a different ethnic group enter its borders and immediately separated itself
from the Moluccans. The relationship was a top-down one, where the former Dutch masters
still controlled the lives of the Moluccans and constantly acted in what it perceived was the
best interests of the Moluccan immigrants. Often ignored were the actual opinions of the
Moluccans, not to mention the important fact that the new immigrant community was not
homogenous. The Moluccans had come from different islands, different educational
backgrounds, different religions and practices, and as the group became more permanent,
different socio-economic standing in the Netherlands. Therefore, not all the Moluccan
residents desired one particular outcome to their situation. This understanding of the
immigrant group has repeated itself today with how the Dutch government looks upon the
guest workers who have stayed in the Netherlands, searching, for example, to form one
uniform Islamic organization with which the Dutch can discuss issues of culture and faith.
The colonial mindset, somewhat fading in recent generations, still causes the Dutch to work
in a top-down manner instead of forging a peer relationship with the new ethnic groups that
enter its borders. To fully understand this mindset, one must look at the three hundred years
of colonial history that built the original relationship between the Dutch and the Moluccans.
One must travel “from the surface of society to the depths of the ideas which move and
explain [the society]”. 40 In this case, many of the ideas that have created the modern Dutch
relationship with immigrant populations is the Dutch colonial history.
Het Eeuwig Verbond
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Just as the Moluccans were shocked by the strange new land that they arrived at in the
1950s, Dutch sailors who first stepped foot on the Moluccan islands of the East Indies must
have felt that they had entered a different world. Spreading out their exploration to the east,
Dutch ship captains encountered for the first time in March of 1599 a massive cluster of
islands, nine-hundred and ninety nine that is today categorized as the Moluccas, most of
which were teeming with agricultural life and thus, for the colonial explorers, containing a
great deal of trading wealth. Unfazed by the fact that the Portuguese had arrived almost one
hundred years before them in 1522, the Dutch trading vessels, in conjunction with Dutch
naval boats set about to take over the islands and set up a trading colony there. 41 In 1605, the
Dutch for the first time allied themselves with an ethnically Ambonese tribe of the Moluccas,
the Hitus, in a battle against the Portuguese. 42 The result of this action was the establishment
of the famous “Het eeuwig verbond”, an oft-repeated Dutch phrase meaning “the eternal
bond” that was formed between the Ambonese and the Dutch. Interestingly, the Hitus were
Muslims, whom, shortly after the Portuguese left, were terribly repressed by the Dutch who
switched alliances to more Christian villages and tribes. 43 A famed 20th century leader of the
Moluccan government in exile, A.Th. Manusama, described this initial relationship as one
that was mutually beneficial and completely accepted by the Moluccan people. “We have
brought the Dutch flag, under which we now stand, voluntarily into our country and entrusted
our land to the hands of the Dutch not as a conquered people but as ally to a generous
protector, so that we could never be enemies.” 44 Once the Portuguese had been successfully
defeated, the Dutch set about to build up their new colony. Utilizing the newly formed
Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 45 , the famed Dutch East Indies Company, as the
commercial enterprise operating the trade from the Indies, the Dutch government gained an
incredible amount of profit from products harvested in the Indies and sold throughout the
world. Specifically in the Moluccas, cloves, nutmeg and mace became the most profitable
crops and eventually, through shrewd planning and underhanded, violent power struggles in
the area, the Ambonese islands in what is today the central Moluccas became the only place
in the world that produced cloves for trade purposes. The Dutch had created a monopoly in
41
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the Moluccas and were vicious in protecting this seemingly inexhaustible source of income. 46
This clove trade “resulted in the extinction of independent political and economic life in the
Ambonese islands.” 47 Through the business practices of the early colonial power in the East
Indies, any semblance of being an ally, as the leader A. Th. Manusama stated above
disappeared. As with most colonial relationships, the Moluccans became the property of the
Dutch colonial authority and, for three hundred years, lived subserviently to them.
Dutch historians frequently cite this concept of het eeuwig verbond as essential to
understanding the loyalty of the Moluccans to the Dutch colonial authorities. Indeed, over the
more than three hundred years of Dutch rule, the Ambonese and most of the other Moluccans
remained tenuously supportive of the Dutch. However, in the glorifying texts about Dutch
and Moluccan relations, much of the trauma of colonial rule has slipped from the pages of
Dutch history books. The VOC was a particularly violent organization and it prided itself on
taking as many profitable resources from the Dutch East Indies at the lowest cost. This meant
that, for centuries, the Moluccans and other Indonesians were terribly repressed. One tool
that was used specifically in the Moluccas which shaped its history was conversion of the
native population to Christianity. Promoting Christianity, specifically Dutch Calvinism, in
the Moluccas was seen as one of the best ways to “promote the loyalty of the population”. 48
When this conversion did not work, violence was the next resort. In a thirty year period,
between 1630 and 1660, the Ambonese population shrank by a third, from seventy-five
thousand to fifty thousand. 49 More than a century later, the VOC finally went bankrupt and
the power hierarchy was replaced by a more traditional colonial structure. The Dutch
government, in the 19th century, used the Indies islands as a “goose that laid the golden egg”,
taxing all the land on the major islands and reaping the profits from the local people who
were, in essence, agriculturally enslaved to the land. This led to major uprisings in the
Moluccas and other parts of the Dutch East Indies, when Christian and Muslim villages
banded together to fight Dutch rule. The brutality in which the uprising was put down was
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almost unimaginable, even by colonial standards, and it left wide swaths of the countryside
destroyed and the Moluccan population decimated. 50
The Ethical Policy of Colonialism
Oddly, the culmination of this uprising and the Dutch oppression throughout the war
produced some positive changes in the relationship between the Dutch and their colonial
subjects, including the Moluccans. Combined with uproar back in the Netherlands, in part
due to the publishing of the famous colonial novel Max Havelaar, which revealed some of
the travesties being committed in the name of the Dutch flag, the home government decided
to implement new “gentler” colonial policies. This so called “ethical policy” at the end of the
19th century argued that the Dutch owed a “debt of honor” to the Dutch East Indies for
contributing so much to the small empire. In her speech of 1901, the Queen of Holland
announced that it was the “moral duty” of the Netherlands to “improve the welfare of people
in colonial Indonesia.” 51 Unfortunately, in a way, nothing changed due to this ethical policy.
The exploitation of the islands could continue, but the Dutch would invest part of the profits
from the islands in establishing European schools and other forms of infrastructure in the
islands. In some ways, these new steps in the islands helped the Indonesians and other
colonial subjects. Education rates increased and the standard of living in some of the cities
rose quickly. However, the population also grew wildly at the time, which the Dutch
attempted to solve in the ethical policy sense by forcibly moving people from the main island
of Java to some of the eastern reaches of the colony. 52
The ethical policy, therefore, is more important for a study of post-colonial
immigrants in Holland as to the impact on the Dutch mindset in how the government
regarded its colonial subjects. As it entered into a more civilized existence, the Dutch
colonial authority was, at once, attempting to moralize and to make money. While by no
means an exclusively Dutch trait, as most of the other European powers also attempted some
form of Christian conversion and Europeanization of their colonies while simultaneously
exploiting the people and the resources of the third world, the Dutch are often spoken of
historically as wanting to be “a Minister and a Merchant” in its colonies. It was even turned
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into a Dutch adage, De koopman en de dominee, a phrase that can be applied to Dutch
colonial practices after the implementation of the ethical policy. Building up to World War
Two, this phrase about the mix of religion and economics also has had long lasting
consequences on how the Dutch perceive new immigrants in their country, beginning with
the remnants from the Dutch East Indies colony, the Moluccan immigrants of the 1950s. 53
This is the essence of the colonial mindset that was pervasive in the Netherlands and other
European countries long after the end of the Second World War. The top-down approach by
the Dutch Colonial government in the Dutch East Indies continued in its relationship with
new immigrants in the country. There was a sense in the colonies that the Dutch always knew
what was best for their Indonesian and Moluccan subjects and this sense often appears in the
contemporary debate about immigrants in the Netherlands. This can also be seen in the
mindset of some of the older generation in the Netherlands, one that has taken on a personal
note for me as a researcher and one that I have explored by attempting to piece together the
story of my grandfather, an ethnically Dutch man born and raised in Indonesia, along with
the societal factors that have, through no fault of his own, shaped the Dutch mindset into one
that looks down upon those people coming from the non-western world.
Opar
It has begun to rain in Den Helder, one of the northernmost cities in the Netherlands
and home to the Dutch naval fleet. It had always been part of my plan while researching
Dutch colonialism and the Moluccan community in the Netherlands to sit down with my
grandfather and discuss his childhood in Indonesia and his subsequent life in the Netherlands.
However, as the day approached, I found myself more hesitant to make the research personal.
When I had explained my initial study to my grandfather, he had expressed joy, as he often
does, that I had taken up an interest that intertwined with his life story, yet, under the surface,
I could feel the tension that often comes up when discussing the immigrants of Holland.
Though my grandfather is quite proud of his Indonesian birthplace and the history of the
Netherlands in Indonesia, we have frequently and not always gently tangled over the role that
non-western Dutch citizens play in the country. In one breath, my grandfather proclaims
himself to be one of the first “allochtoon”, a Dutch phrase allocated for those who have a
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non-ethnically Dutch background, yet also argues that the large influx of Turkish and
Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands is quite detrimental to Dutch society and that the
spread of Islam is a danger that “the younger generation will have to deal with.” It is through
this familial relationship that I became interested in the subject of Islam in the Netherlands
and, through broader research, the Moluccans and the colonial residue that continues to affect
the relationship between the indigenous people of this small, proud Western European
country and the new immigrants who voyage over long and dangerous distances to have a
chance at a better, safer life for themselves and their families. I wanted to explore my
grandfather’s world, but also understand it from the other side and complexly delve into the
under the surface reasons for my grandfather’s, and so many other Dutchmen’s, attitudes
towards the immigrant population here. 54
My grandfather’s story begins unlike most Dutchmen because he was born on a hill.
Unlike the flatland of the Netherlands, west Java is filled with great, rolling hills and sharp,
densely forested mountains and it was there, in the small town of Tjiandjoer (today, spelled
Cianjur in Malay) that the son of two Dutch colonial citizens was born in 1930. He grew up
playing in the dark quinine plants of a plantation that his father managed, getting in the way
of the Indonesian workers as they hunched over to gather tea plants in the woven baskets on
their backs. These two plants, once processed and cleaned were loaded onto the large diesel
trucks that would make the eighty kilometer trek monthly to and from the city of Bandung,
where the produce, begot by the hard labor of the Indonesian laborers, was prepared for
export. In the attic of memory, my grandfather looks back quite fondly on this early period of
life, proudly presenting a picture of him as a child in a toy car near the “bungalow” home of
his family. It is described, in Dutch-Indonesian post-colonial literature as a nostalgia for
“tempo doeloe”, an Indonesian phrase for the “old days.” 55 He remembers, though he was
only eleven when the Japanese invaded Java in early 1942, that his father was quite
comfortable with his Indonesian workers and “never had a conflict with them.” Once the
invasion occurred however, the Dutch were stuck between the Japanese war machine and
Indonesian nationalism and this, according to grandfather, is when the idyllic life on
Indonesia ended and the dream of establishing an ethical colony, one meant to help the
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Indonesians as well as the Dutch faded. “We were still having the idea, the idealistic idea,
that we could bring Christianity and education. We are not against you [as if speaking to
Indonesians in 1940], we want only to have you together in the nicest colony ever.” 56 Weeks
later, my grandfather, along with the rest of his family, were placed in various prisoner of
war camps on Java. In the last days of the war, as it appeared that the Japanese would not win
the war and as supplies became increasingly scarce, my grandfather watched his father die of
malnutrition in 1945. 57
The Moluccans were only a small fraction of the population that came from Indonesia
after the declaration of independence of the Indonesian republic. My grandfather was one of
the approximately 250,000 “Indo-European” colonial citizens who came to the Netherlands
over the fifteen years after the fall of the colony.58 Similar to the Moluccans, many of these
people had never left the East Indies and had certainly never ventured into western Europe.
This was a difficult part of my grandfather’s life. Though he was a “belanda Totok”, the
Indonesian phrase for a fully ethnically Dutch person living in the Indonesian colony (as
opposed to Indo, which was usually used to classify those people with mixed European and
Indonesian ethnicities), it was still relatively difficult for him to feel at home in the
Netherlands. Reminiscing with the booming laugh that often punctuates his stories, my
grandfather remembers being told that he “was not speaking proper Dutch” and being awed
by the odd Dutch children whose cheeks turned red in the January cold. 59 Luckily for him,
along with his mother and brothers, my grandfather was able to live with Dutch family
members in Doordrecht when they arrived in the Netherlands in 1948, a luxury that the
Moluccan soldiers and most Indo repatriates did not have.
Here, one can see an interesting difference between the Indos and the Moluccans. The
Moluccans were separated much more from Dutch society than the Indos were, due primarily
to the belief that the Moluccan community was temporary here in the Netherlands. Thus,
despite the pain, confusion and loneliness experienced by the newly arriving Indo community
in the Netherlands, the Dutch government took many impressive policy steps to make these
new Indo-European countrymen feel welcome and enable them to integrate into Dutch
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society properly. One striking action, beginning in the early 1950s was the “five percent
rule.” This housing zoning code “obliged all municipalities to reserve five percent of newlyconstructed houses in the social sector for repatriates from Indonesia.” 60 This ensured that
not only would the new residents in the Netherlands have permanent houses, but also that
they would not establish enclave communities. My grandfather and others like him had the
opportunity to live in mixed neighborhoods, a system that was much more conducive to
integration than the majority of the Moluccan wards and later, than the neighborhoods
reserved for the Turkish and Moroccan guest workers, who were also believed to be
temporary. 61
On a more personal level, my grandfather does recognize that he was accepted
quickly in the Netherlands, a place that he had never visited but always felt a strong
connection to even as a child in Indonesia. “My room had many Dutch things,” he proclaims
proudly. “I loved the Dutch sailboats.” 62 He says, in a matter of fact manner, that this
acceptance was because he looked like most of his Dutch neighbors and had learned the
importance of education from his mother. He even admits, when regarding his integration in
hindsight as comparison, that this is one of the major problems of integration today. The
immigrants from Turkey and Morocco came from “poor schools or no education” and so they
do not fit in here in Holland as he did in the early 1950s. This recognition is essential to
seeing how the colonial experienced has affected, but not completely structured my
grandfather’s perception of immigration and the minority groups that live with him in the
Netherlands. While there are still remnants of a European-superior mindset, as when he
wonders out loud whether the Indonesians were capable after their independence of running
the plantations as efficiently as the Dutch had, he still can, when pressed, acknowledge the
difficulties faced by immigrants in western countries. 63 Unfortunately for the Moluccans and
for the guest workers later on, there are still these traces of European superiority in the way
that they are approached.
Superiority and Collective Memory Loss
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As the important 20th century scholars of post-colonialism have explored, this idea of
foisting western government, western culture and western capitalism on the far reaches of the
third world served to set up a mental dichotomy between the two places. Scholars, especially
over the past half-century, have examined the complicated history between the colonizers
and the colonized and many argue that the relationship between immigrants and their new
home in a western nation is deeply colored by this historical epoch. “White superiority was
implicit in the very mobility of the Europeans. They were the ones controlling [and] initiating
the encounter.” 64 Well after the initial exploration and conquering of the East Indies, the
Dutch faced another part of history that had an incredible impact on their relationship with
the third world and specifically Indonesia. Just as many other European nations did, the
Dutch faced a colonial war shortly after World War Two ended. This is an oft-forgotten
period of history. During a series of military actions euphemistically coined “politionele
acties” in 1947 and 1949, approximately one hundred thousand Indonesians were killed
along with six thousand Dutch and KNIL soldiers. 65 It has been suggested that the Dutch
have experienced a collective memory loss about the war in Indonesia, a war where most of
the future Moluccan immigrants fought for the Dutch and where they lost many of their
comrades fighting for the Dutch colonial power. Some contemporary Dutch scholars have
begun to recognize this absence of acknowledgement about the brutality of the Dutch colony.
“The violent nature of Dutch colonial practice, its far-reaching effects on the lives of the
colonized people as well as the Dutch failure to accomplish a peaceful process of
decolonization are themes that are often silenced in social and political discourse.” 66 This
silence, extending even to 2000 when the Dutch Prime Minister, Wim Kok, was forced to
apologize for criticizing Dutch policies in the East Indies colony, has further increased the
colonial mindset that has been established in the Netherlands in regarding new migrants. 67
The goals of Dutch colonialism revert back to the idea of the De koopman en de
dominee. Crudely put, the Dutch felt they were “enlightening the backward, civilizing the
savage, and Christianizing the pagan.” 68 These paternalistic tasks the Dutch colonial
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government tried to put in place with the ethical policy and other colonial measures have
been repeated with the immigrants in the Netherlands today. For example, the government
set up “assimilation and resocialization” policies for immigrants coming from the defunct
East Indies colony. They, including my grandfather and some Moluccans who expressed
interest in staying in the Netherlands, could learn “proper Dutch” and were expected to
immerse themselves in Dutch culture. 69 When specifically looking at the Moluccan
experience, even as the population became permanent in the 1960s and 1970s, the Dutch
government continued to refer all issues of the Moluccans to the Department of Social
Welfare. Problems were not handled in the same way that issues arising from various other
Dutch groups were. The Moluccans were given no control over their lives, even after living
in the Netherlands for more than a decade. 70 This process seems to be replaying itself in
contemporary Holland with the new implementation of imburgering classes, where
immigrants are expected not only to learn the Dutch language, but also take courses in Dutch
history, geography and culture. “Integration is an obligation” in the Netherlands. 71 The
language has even been expanded to distinguish between “us” and “them” in the usage of the
phrase autochtoon (meaning an indigenous Dutch person) and allochtoon (a person with a
non-western background, even if they were born and raised in Holland). Furthermore, similar
to the way in which the Moluccans were handled, the initial reaction to the guest worker
immigrants was to grant them subsidies and social welfare programs “because the immigrant
workers from Turkey and Morocco were expected to return to their original homes.” 72 Once,
however, they became permanent, a repetition of the colonial mindset continued somewhat in
the governmental thinking. There continues to be an established dichotomy between the
natives and the immigrants; one where integration is ultimately hampered by the top-down
and, in many ways, paternalistic relationship.
These colonialist sentiments pepper the conversation with my grandfather, just as
they are sprinkled throughout much for the immigration debate in the Netherlands. Most
often, they are benevolent. Sometimes, they are not. When the subject of the Moluccans
returns to the forefront of our discussion, my grandfather became agitated. “I feel so guilty
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for them” he said mournfully. “We promised them that they could go home. They did a
fantastic job as Dutch soldiers to protect us.” 73 Interestingly in the history of the Netherlands,
for pro-colonial Dutchmen, the Moluccans became a symbol of the failure of the Dutch to
keep their colony. Right-wing politicians used the Moluccan cause, not as a way to better the
lives of the immigrants, but to attack the moderate Dutch government for working together
with the new Indonesian nation. 74 However, lost in the World War Two and the war for
independence in Indonesia where the Moluccans were largely regarded as traitors by the
Indonesian nationalists and as loyal comrades by the outnumbered and beleaguered Dutch
soldiers, was the fact that most Moluccans were ambivalent at best about Dutch rule in the
East Indies. They fought for the Dutch against the Japanese and then against the armies of
Sukarno because there was a sense amongst the leaders of the various islands that Dutch rule
was preferable. An image of the Moluccan soldier slowly emerged over the centuries since
the proclamation of het eeuwig verbond, one that promoted the concept of the Moluccan
culture as being one of warriors, “the loyal and gallant upholder of Netherlands authority in
the archipelago.” 75 However, many KNIL soldiers, especially in the 19th century, were forced
to fight for the Dutch. Some were lured with alcohol while others were simply kidnapped and
sent to a far-away Indonesian island with no hope of return unless they completed military
service for the Dutch. 76 Even this image was cultivated in colonial times and has been
misconstrued in modern Holland. “I try to remind the teenagers here that we were originally
farmers and traders,” Wim Manuhutu says in his office as the director of the Maluku
Museum in Utrecht. “The population here in the Netherlands is different because most of the
men were soldiers.” 77 The Dutch colonial authority culled many of its recruits for the KNIL
army from the Moluccan Christian population because it was felt by many Dutchmen that
Islam was the main enemy in the Indonesian colonies. This colonial glorification of the
Moluccan community continued, despite the historical truth that the Moluccans were not
unquestioning loyalists to the Dutch crown. Even in their existence here in Holland, an
assumption was made that the Moluccans would accept what the Dutch gave them since they
had been so loyal before. However, as the Dutch government ignored the Moluccans over
73
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time, the myth of loyalty and humble submission to the will of the Dutch government was
eventually shattered with the terrorist actions of the 1970s.
Radicalization of the Second Generation: Alienation and Terrorism
One had worked as a social worker in Amsterdam. The other worked as a dental
assistant in Assen, in the north of Holland. The Amsterdammer had been born there, raised in
a moderately religious home and attended Dutch schools. He was “known as a good kid in
school”, and had spent much of his early 20s as a role model for other second generation
teens, working with them to find positive after school activities and writing for a
neighborhood bulletin. The second young person had been born in the east of Holland and
was described as a hard worker, happy and never late. She came from a pious, traditional
household. Both people’s mother did not speak Dutch and though their fathers had worked
hard to build a home in the Netherlands, the youths were constantly reminded of their ethnic
and social roots. Her father had been a soldier, but was reduced to physical labor when he
moved to the Netherlands. The father of the Amsterdammer had become crippled during his
years of menial jobs and was no longer able to kneel and pray. He had to pray sitting in a
chair.
The similarities between these two young people’s brief biography reveals an
enlightening historical overlap. The woman, born in 1955 in the Westerbork camp and raised
in the evangelical Moluccan church was Hansina Uktolseja, one of the nine Moluccan train
hijackers who held train passengers hostage for three weeks near her home in Assen in 1977.
The man, born one year after the train hostage crisis ended in bloodshed and in Hansina’s
death, is Mohammed Bouyeri, the now infamous murderer of Dutch filmmaker and critic of
Islam, Theo van Gogh. Shortly before their acts of violence, both had become more radical.
Hansina had become “soaked in Christian belief” and had changed from being “a sweet,
modest girl” to becoming “more Moluccan.” She began dating Rudi Lumalessil, another one
of the to-be train hijackers and one whose brother was already in jail for participating in a
Moluccan terrorist action in 1975. Mohammed, shortly after his mother died in 2002, quit his
job, went on welfare and became increasingly religious. He joined a fundamentalist mosque
in Amsterdam and befriended other young religious Muslims who also felt angry and
disconnected from their homeland. Both of these people viciously and angrily lashed out
against Dutch society, becoming terrorists in order to further their political cause and

28

personal beliefs. The similarities, therefore, of the wave of terrorism by members of the
Moluccan second generation in the 1970s to the increased radicalization of some Islamic
second-generation youth is striking and revealing. By placing these two people next to each
other in the confines of anthropological history, the Netherlands and perhaps researchers of
terrorism can learn a great deal. The rage that both theses young people felt was not because
they belonged to the same religion, read the same inflammatory texts or fought for the same
cause. Instead, they felt trapped by circumstances, felt stuck between the world of their
parents and the world of their peers and felt victimized by their new homeland. It is this sense
of alienation; the feelings of having no power and no voice in their own country that
contributed to their individual radicalization. While these circumstances in no way excuses
their violence or their vitriol, it does offer a glimpse into the foundations of radicalization and
once again, the Moluccan case lends a historical palette from which the western world can
learn when debating Islamic immigration today. 78
Violence of the 1970s
The first jolt through the collective conscience of Dutch society occurred on August
31, 1970. For most Dutchmen, the Moluccan immigrants were a distant group and most were
unaware of any problems. This changed when a group of young Moluccans took over the
Indonesian Embassy in Den Haag, the day before the President of Indonesia, Suharto, was
scheduled to visit. During this hostage crisis, named the “Wassenaar Incident,” one Dutch
policeman was killed. There had been an aborted attempt to light the embassy on fire four
years previous, but this was the first act of overt violence and one that stunned the Dutch
public. 79 However, this did not prepare them for the actions five years later near the small
town of Beilen. Police arrived and surrounded a train that had been reported to be hijacked.
Many of the local law enforcement were completely baffled by the demands of the hijackers,
who wanted a swift declaration of Dutch governmental support for an independent Moluccan
state along with the release of sixteen Moluccan youth who had been convicted for plotting
to kidnap Queen Juliana the previous year. 80 When this did not occur, along with the failure
to produce a plane to the hijackers, the local Dutch policemen watched in horror as the young
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Moluccan men, between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight, flung the bodies of two
murdered passengers from the train doors. 81 On the third day of the hostage situation,
broadcast on live television around the Netherlands, the Moluccan terrorists brought a man in
a yellow shirt and a red tie outside of the train and shot him dead. “Soldiers standing a few
hundred yards away openly wept at the cruel sight.” 82 Almost simultaneously, young
Moluccans also took over the Indonesian consulate in Amsterdam, where one person was
killed. The rage of the Moluccan second generation was spilling over. For those young men
and women who became radicalized in this time period, discussion about a future in the
Moluccas was no longer a workable option. They wanted to take action. Two years later, it
was Hansina Uktolseja’s turn as she, along with eight Moluccan men, hijacked a train in a
similar fashion. The Dutch government’s reaction was fierce. 83 Perhaps because the second
train hijacking, in 1977, was done in conjunction with the taking over of a Dutch school in
Bolvensmilde by Moluccan militants, the Dutch government was not willing to listen to the
demands of the hijackers, nor were they going to let their soldiers stand by and watch
violence unfold. The government forces did wait twenty days to storm the train near Assen,
which is home to one of the largest Moluccan populations in Holland, but when the
command was given, the soldiers used deadly force unflinchingly, resulting in the death of
six of the Moluccan hijackers and two of the hostages. Hansina was one of them, killed a few
miles away from the home where she was born and grew up in, but in a country where she
never felt like she belonged.84
The Netherlands, through the Comissariaat Ambonezenzorg, controlled the lives of
the Moluccan immigrants and had, as an official policy, the necessity of Moluccan
repatriation to Indonesia until 1970. 85 This means that for 19 years, and thus for most of the
lives of Moluccan second generation youth, the government was constantly reinforcing the
concept that these young people did not belong in the Netherlands. Absurdly, the Dutch
government mentioned the hope, in official documents, that the Moluccans will return to the
Indonesian islands as late as 1980. 86 This mindset of not belonging was also routinely
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reinforced at home, as the first generation was less likely to look upon the Netherlands as
their home, but more as a temporary refuge. This generation, the generation of soldiers and
their family, wrapped themselves in the trauma of the Indonesian experience as a way of
feeling less isolated and could not entirely, even after having a family in the Netherlands and
eventually finding work and a permanent life, consider themselves at home. 87
As the second generation grew up and as the Dutch government began to get used to
the concept that the Moluccans were here to stay in the Netherlands, the families began to
move into different parts of the Netherlands. Suddenly, the youth began to interact with nonMoluccan Dutch and attend heterogeneous, multicultural schools and social gatherings. Their
quest for personal identity was quickly transformed by one dutifully connected with their
parents struggle to return to the Moluccan Islands to one with opposing sides. In essence they
faced the same questions that many Turkish and Moroccan youths do today; a clash between
the “old and the new, between loyalty to their own community and the quest for
modernity.” 88 The Moluccan second generation was stuck “betwixt and between.” This topic
of the “in-between generation” elicited a wide range of responses. Joss Wibisono, a Javanese
political exile and the current head of the Indonesian Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep
describes this feeling as “living a double life.” One has a different life at home than at school,
a different life in the Moluccan church than at work, in the Moluccan ward than in a mixed
neighborhood. 89 Professor van Amersfoort sees the isolation of the camps as somewhat
responsible for creating these feelings of estrangement. “They all had to live in camps and
neighborhoods where there was no opening or perspective for the younger generations. That
was a big mistake.” 90
Wim Manuhutu
Wim Manuhutu offers one of the most revealing opinions about this generation and is
a biographical reminder that most of the second generation, as in any case of immigration,
did not radicalize in the 1970s. Today, Wim Manuhutu is the director of the Maluku Museum
in Utrecht. A tall, lanky man, immaculately dressed and appearing younger than his fortynine years, Manuhutu has been the director of the most important institution of Moluccan
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culture and history in the Netherlands since its inception in 1986. Intimately involved
professionally with the cause of Moluccan culture as well as with an ongoing cultural
dialogue with the indigenous Dutch population in Utrecht and throughout the Netherlands,
Mr. Manuhutu also has a distinct and revealing personal biography. He, of course, is one of
the Moluccan second generation, born in a Dutch housing camp and sent through the Dutch
school system, attending both a majority Moluccan primary school and an almost completely
indigenous Dutch secondary school. He was born in the Lunetten camp in Vught in 1959, but
shortly thereafter moved with his family to Leerdam. The Dutch town, famous for its glass
and crystal industry, quickly built a neighborhood of one-hundred twelve houses for the
arriving Moluccans and this is where the young Mr. Manuhutu grew up. 91 His story is
somewhat unusual for Moluccans in the Netherlands because his father, while one of the
original Moluccan immigrants, was not a soldier, but a teacher in Macassa who sought refuge
with the Moluccan soldiers when Indonesia declared its independence. Mr. Manuhutu’s
mother is not Moluccan, but rather was of mixed European and Indonesian ethnicity. She met
his father while teaching Moluccan immigrant children in one of the earliest camps here in
the Netherlands. Therefore, having two parents with an education background, Mr.
Manuhutu acknowledges that education was always stressed in his household and this
propelled him to mix with indigenous Dutch students and strive to achieve academically and
professionally. He remembers that this was not always easy, recalling teasing from both the
Moluccan kids in his neighborhood who thought of him as strange for working so hard as
well as some bullying by indigenous Dutch kids who reacted to his different appearance.
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a difficult time for the Moluccan community in
the Netherlands. Mr. Manuhutu remembers that, increasingly in the wards, there were
problems with drugs, crime and poverty. These problems led to increased violence in the
wards as well. Most of the second generation came from families with a military background
and so, “one of the codes was you don’t run away from fights.” 92 All around the Moluccan
community, Dutch society was improving and growing. Economically, the Netherlands was
growing rapidly in the 1970s, adding almost three percent of growth a year. 93 However, this
was not positively affecting the Moluccan community. It is perhaps of little surprise,
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therefore, that the major advent of radicalization occurred around the same time the second
generation was emerging out of the shadow of their parents and the Dutch government was
beginning to acknowledge the permanence of the Moluccans, while at the same time, failing
to take any meaningful steps to further aid and integrate them into Dutch society.
Unemployment increased greatly during this time for the Moluccans and as the community
fell into economic instability, it became increasingly isolated and self-reliant. “In times of
tension, you close ranks,” Mr. Manuhutu suggests.
All these problems should seem familiar to students of the Islamic immigrant
population in the Netherlands today. The Moluccans of the 1970s were facing a crisis of
identity and were not offered the support that it needed as a whole to pull itself out of the
wave of economic destitution. Out of these troubles rose the violence and terrorism that
spanned the decade. Mr. Manuhutu also notes the similarities between this period of rage in
the Moluccan community and what is occurring in the Moroccan and Turkish communities
today. The more the Moluccans felt ignored and alienated from their Dutch society, the more
they withdrew. “This is a parallel to Muslims right now. The more you marginalize a group,
the more there is a sense to solidify.” 94 The second generation developed during this time of
marginalization and experienced an identity crisis strong enough that some of its members
became terrorists and violently lashed out against Dutch society.
Spiritual Radicalization
Religion also played a signature role in the radicalization of the second generation
Moluccan youth. The Moluccan community was, generally, a religious one. The vast
majority, over 90% of the original immigrants, were Protestant Christians and affiliated
themselves with one of two churches in the Netherlands, the Geredja Indjil Maluku and the
Badan Persatuan Maluku. 95 Although the Moluccas themselves are split evenly between
Muslims and Christians today, the soldiers recruited by the Dutch were mostly Christian,
leading to the difference in make-up of the Dutch Moluccans. This Christianity was not
strictly aligned with the Dutch Calvinist Church, which had attempted to proselytize and
convert Moluccans during the colonial period. Instead, it weaves tradition Calvinism in with
tribal traditions, for example, by still setting out money wrapped in paper, a tradition called
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Piring Nazar, for the Moluccan ancestors. Many of the young Moluccans, like Hansina
Uktolseja, grew up attending the Geredja Indjil church, which was the more political
institution in the Netherlands and often referred to itself as a church “in exile.” Therefore, the
sermons of the 1970s were often filled with anger over the treatment of the Moluccans by the
Dutch government and some of the teenagers, looking for role models in the Moluccan
community, found this politicized faith appealing. In the villages of the Moluccas, “the
church did not have such a prominent position.” The youth would often turn to village elders
or other local leaders for identity crises and personal struggles. However, here in the
Netherlands, “the clergy had the power.” 96 This also reveals an interesting twist on the
current debate that has revolved so much around the role of Islam in the radicalization of the
Moroccan and Turkish youth. It would seem from the history of the Moluccans that Islam is
not the only faith that lends itself to radicalization. Rather, when the second generation does
not feel comfortable turning outside to Dutch society or inside to their parents, there is a void
that needs to be filled and this can often be achieved through increased religious faith.
However, this faith can easily be politicized and lead to the violence that erupted in Hansina
Uktolseja and, years later, in Mohammed Bouyeri.
Fighting for and with the Older Generation
One other essential aspect to scrutinize in the identity crisis of second and third
generation immigrants is their relationship with the first generation. This is no different in
studies of Moroccan and Turkish youngsters today and it certainly applies to the
radicalization of Moluccan adolescents in the 1970s. Culturally, and also due to the historical
nature of militarism in the Moluccan immigrant population, the Moluccan took strength and
military might seriously. It was a point of honor to serve in the military and to actively fight
for the Moluccan homeland. Most of the second generation of Moluccans had grown up in
families where the father had been an officer in the Dutch colonial army and yet, upon arrival
in the Netherlands, had been discharged and forced to find other means of work. In a way,
the entire generation of fathers in the Moluccan community had been demoted, forced out of
the military profession that they had taken so much pride in and left to their own devices in a
foreign country with foreign customs and different labor practices. Many of theses men were
reduced to menial labor, well below their physical expertise or their educational background.
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Thus, the teenagers, especially the Moluccan boys, grew up watching, unconsciously for the
most part, their father being emasculated, in a sense, by the Dutch government. Their
strength and their job of honor had been taken away by the lack of thoughtfulness and action
of the Dutch immigration authorities. This led the Moluccan teenagers, as it did in some
ways with Mohammed Bouyeri as he watched his father become crippled and unable to pray
properly, to both anger against the Dutch government and, on a sub-conscious, psychological
level, resentment of and embarrassment by their parents. They felt powerless in Dutch
society and they were furious that their parents did not take decisive action about the wrongs
that had been committed against them. It is partially for this reason that the second generation
was more likely to be radical and lashed out against the Dutch society in violent, destructive
ways. One way of handling marginalization and ostracism is to force others to pay attention
and this is exactly what the Moluccan youth did. This unbelievable fury of the young men
manifests itself in the absolute brutal violence of the train hijackings in 1975 and 1977. It is
important to note, on top of this, that while at the end of the 1970s, the older generation had
rejected entirely these acts of violence, initially, the young men were hailed as “men of
action” by their community. 97 They were reclaiming, in a sense, the power that had been
taken from their fathers in the mishandled immigration of the 1950s and made sure that the
Dutch paid attention to the Moluccan minority. While their actions were reprehensible and
certainly detrimental to their home community in the long run, it showed how many
problems had been caused by the Dutch government’s lack of action in building a fair and
even-leveled relationship with the Moluccan community.
Reactions and Attempts at Reconciliation
In a way, the series of Moluccan terrorist actions worked. All of sudden, twenty-six
years after the first Moluccans immigrated to the Netherlands, the indigenous Dutch
population took real notice of their neighbors. However, it was not a positive reaction from
the general population. This increased radicalism led to a strong political backlash and
nationalist politicians were quick to call for increased checks on Indonesian immigration and
stricter rules regarding Moluccan communities. “The immediate repercussions ranged from
Dutch civilians cursing Moluccans on the streets to police harassing young Moluccans or
anybody who faintly resembled them, including many Dutch-Indonesians. A more long-term
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effect resulted from stereotyping Moluccans as violence prone, leading to widespread
discrimination, particularly on the labor market.” 98 One man, a father of one of the children
held in the school take-over, famously remarked upon arriving at the scene “I'm going to get
my gun and make sure this never happens again. We hate those black bastards.”99 Wim
Manuhutu remembers that for a while, people would not sit next to him on busses or trains.
“They thought that I must be one of them, one of the hijackers.” 100
There were other interesting reactions to the terrorism in the late 1970s. My
grandfather, perhaps because of the guilt that he feels for the early treatment of the
Moluccans in the Netherlands, did not react in anger to the train hijackings. This, he says,
was not really terrorism. “It was claiming interest for the situation here.” Even though he
says that the use of violence was wrong of the Moluccans, it is not similar in his eyes to the
Islamic terrorism today. “They [the Moluccans] claimed their rights. They were also Dutch.
The Dutch government had to give them a better place.” He says he comprehends the rage
that these young Moluccans felt because they were Dutchmen who were not treated as such.
“I understand their complaint.” 101
The Moluccan community was rocked by the events of the late 1970s. Many were
stunned by the actions of their relatives and neighbors. Early on, there were more mixed
feelings about the violent acts. In 1970, when the embassy was taken over, the young men
were “celebrated as heroes by a majority” of Moluccans. 102 “One day of violence was more
effective than twenty years of peaceful negotiations.” However, this changed as the attacks
intensified in violence. The wake left by the murdering of the train passengers was immense.
In 1977, especially, many in the community felt deeply ashamed that its members would take
over a school and terrorize children. They were as horrified as other Dutch citizens at the
images on the television of frightened children appearing in the windows of the seized
school. However, imaginably, while the community rejected the radical violence that swept
the country, it also felt deeply connected to the young men and women who perpetrated the
crimes. They were part of the Moluccan family after all and despite their horrible deeds, were
mourned. The deaths of the six hijackers in 1977 was the most painful for the community. “It
98

Bartels. Can the Train…?
Caroll, R. et al., Children of Terror. Newsweek. June 6, 1977
100
Interview with Wim Manuhutu, Utrecht
101
Interview with Reinout van Wagtendonk, Den Helder
102
Interview with Wim Manuhutu, Utrecht
99

36

was our Kennedy moment”, Wim Manuhutu remarks, invoking the John F. Kennedy
assassination. “Everyone knew where you were on June 11 when the [hijacked] train was
attacked.” 103 Mr. Manuhutu remembers as a young college student attending their funeral up
in Assen. He estimates that over seven thousand Moluccan community members made the
trek to the north of Holland. “Six of our people had been killed and we needed to pay respect.
They had paid the ultimate price.” It was a moving experience for the young Mr. Manuhutu,
one that he took a few lessons away from. “There was a general feeling of togetherness.” It
reminded him of the sense of community that he felt amongst his Moluccan peers.
Simultaneously, there was a realization that “nobody wins from violence.” While the
community came together at this incredible event in Assen and still, to this day,
commemorates the death of these six second-generation Moluccans, it also initiated a time
where the community could ponder their role and their place in the Netherlands and this led
to a great deal of positive change heading into the 1980s and beyond. 104
In the wake of the terrorism, there was a great deal of soul-searching throughout the
country. While there was anger and distrust in the Netherlands, sixty-two percent of the
Netherlands favored “strict surveillance of South Moluccans” in 1977 105 , moderate
politicians began the process of stabilizing the Moluccan communities, including investing
more in the schools, providing better housing and job opportunities and opening up the
society to the second and third generations. There was a realization by the Dutch government
that something had to change and remarkably, the governmental response was moderate. The
Prime Minister in the early 1980s, Ruud Lubbers, famously said that it is time “to turn the
page” and extend Dutch prosperity to the Moluccan community. 106 Unlike the reactionary
tone of politics today, there was recognition, even by the government, that “you cannot
always be one hundred percent safe”, but that there were ways to help integrate immigrant
populations and make them feel more welcome. 107 Lubbers set out a plan to do just that. For
example, in the early 1980s, the government set up a program to provide one thousand civil
servant jobs for Moluccan Dutch citizens. 108 It was realized that the period of “non103
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communication” with the immigrant population had to end. 109 There was a dire need for
cultural contact and interaction. In 1986, a major step was taken in this direction with the
creation of the Maluku museum in Utrecht. While originally intended only to be a monument
in the city to the Moluccans, the community argued for and eventually received a cultural
center where, at once, the history of the Moluccans in the Netherlands could be on display
both for the community itself and for indigenous Dutch visitors. Mr. Manuhutu became the
director in 1987 and set out to show the diversity and distinct nature of the first Diaspora
community in the Netherlands. Physical, mental and even verbal divisions had been built up
over the years in the Netherlands and the museum has worked tirelessly to tear these down.
Moving Forward as a Community
Beyond this increase of cultural communication and understanding on the part of the
Dutch government, there was also work done from the Moluccan side to facilitate this
cultural interaction. This effort, seemingly of equal importance to the governmental
initiatives, started as the Moluccan immigrants began to tire of radicalization. They
themselves sought to moderate after feeling marginalized by the radical factions in their
midst. Moluccan leaders emerged to speak out against violence and in favor of improved
relationships with their Dutch neighbors. 110 Wim Manuhutu watched this transformation on a
personal and professional level. The 1980s served as a time of “self reflection.” The
community as a whole began to focus on internal problems, the drug use, the violence, the
poverty, instead of being singularly focused on the outside political issues of the RMS and
Indonesia. There were some rapid changes. Unemployment dropped from a staggering 40%
to a much lower, yet still problematic 20% in the span of a few years. This trend would
continue and today, the Moluccan community is much closer to the indigenous Dutch
average of unemployment. 111 Religiously, young Moluccans put out an important text about
the Piring Nazar tradition, titled “The Value of Identity in a Secular World.” There was an
attempt, inside and outside the church, to hold onto Moluccan roots while understanding
returning to an independent state in the Moluccas was impractical and ultimately, not what
much of the community wanted. The Moluccan church no longer claimed to be an exiled
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entity. 112 Young Moluccans began to find places in the professional and academic realms and
established themselves in new communities throughout the country. By the end of the 1980s,
the descendants of the original immigrants from Indonesia tended to be highly educated with
a high rate of marriage with non-Indonesian spouses and a birth rate on par to the average
indigenous Dutch family. 113 While the boundaries are still being tested, even today, to see
how far the Moluccan minority has embedded itself into the Dutch societal fabric, it is clear
that after a period of radicalization in the immigrant community and governmental
ineffectiveness in adapting to the presence of an immigrant group in the country, both the
immigrant population and the government reached a balance allowing for a relatively
favorable integration outcome.
History has changed the debate about immigration in the Netherlands and the influx
of Turkish and Moroccans into the country is on a much greater scale than the Indonesian
and Moluccan experience. However, it is still quite relevant, despite the changes in policies
and the repeated mistakes by the Dutch government to note the difference in the Moluccan
community between the second and third generation and how time, along with positive steps
both by the government and by the immigrant group itself as a whole, has allowed for a
mostly positive present situation for Moluccans in the Netherlands. Following the end of
terrorism in the beginning of the 1980s, during the heyday for economic immigration in the
Netherlands, the Moluccan community settled more comfortably into Dutch society. In
studies of this third generation, it is clear that the youth feel much more comfortable amongst
their Dutch peers, but also wish to keep hold of some of their Moluccan heritage. This
process of grasping onto cultural roots, procedurally named “cultural maintenance”, is often
referenced in interviews with teenagers with Moluccan ancestry as part of their identity
search. 114 Almost all interviewees in a particular study reject their grandparents desire to
return to the Moluccans. While the first generation referred to trips back to the Moluccas as
“going home”, the younger generations now usually consider such a trip as a vacation. 115
They foresee their future in the Netherlands, yet struggle proactively to remain culturally
connected to the Moluccas. Some do this by becoming bilingual, speaking Dutch and Malay,
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the language of the South Moluccan Islands. Even the language is slowly slipping away in
the natural course of integration. “Once, your identity as a Moluccan was based on the ability
to speak Malay. Now, ninety or ninety-five percent of the third and fourth generation would
not count” if this was still the case. 116 Some of the traditional “identity markers” have been
erased. Traditional Moluccan surnames are disappearing yet young men and women with
common Dutch last names and Moluccan heritage will identify as both Dutch and Moluccan.
A slightly off-colored anecdote related to me shows the relative comfort that Moluccans feel
in being both Dutch and Moluccan. When a new Moluccan mosque, one of two in the
country, was built in the town of Waalwijk, one of the leaders of the Moluccan community
there was asked on a radio show by a caller of Moroccan descent why the Dutch government
had given the community such a nice mosque even though the government was hesitant to
help out the Moroccan Muslim community. The Moluccan leader responded “Well, we are
Dutch and you aren’t yet.” This congregant keeps his religious faith, tied directly to his
Moluccan heritage yet still feels Dutch 117
Of course, this is not to say that the integration has been completely successful for the
later generations of Moluccans. Unfortunately many of the youth still struggle with cultural
differences and feelings of separation due to the color of their skin and their ethnic
background. During the recent outbreak of violence in the Moluccas between Christians and
Muslims, many Moluccans here in the Netherlands felt powerless to help solve the crisis, yet
also felt estranged from their fellow Dutchmen who did not understand or follow the crisis in
the Moluccas. 118 This is a reminder that, even in the best circumstances of integration, there
will not be and should not be a loss of ethnic history and culture. Differences will remain.
However, if the Dutch can begin to learn from the mistakes that were made with the
Moluccan community, there is hope that these lessons can be applied to the Islamic
immigrants of today and future groups of migrants to this small western European nation.
Hopefully, this will allow for a smoother and quicker transition from an alienated, isolated
and marginalized immigrant group to a full member of modern Dutch society.
Conclusion: Looking Forward and Applying the Lessons of History
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The debate about immigration in the Netherlands has erupted over the past decade.
Increasingly, the only voices heard in this period have been the fanatics, the fundamentalists
and the reactionaries on both sides. Terrorist attacks, perpetrated in the name of Islam, have
occurred throughout the western world and radicals here in the Netherlands have been
arrested and charged for plotting similar violence. Politicians like Pim Fortuyn and Geert
Wilders have emerged, unleashing a torrent of political vitriol against the Islamic immigrants
in this country. Wilders even went so far as to make a movie portraying the Islamic religion
as one that is inherently violent and vile, one that should be controlled or even removed from
the confines of the Dutch state. Theo van Gogh, a famed film maker and callous critic of
Islam and most other organized religions was violently murdered in broad daylight by
Mohammed Bouyeri, the aforementioned Dutch-born fanatical Muslim who had ties with
international fundamentalist organizations. For a country that has transformed from an
ethnically homogenous nation to one of the most ethnically diverse in less than half a
century, it must seem almost unbearable to handle the speed and the magnitude in which
problems have appeared on the political and social horizon. It is hard under these
circumstances to do anything but become reactionary. Moderates are drowned out by the
louder and angrier wings on each side. The media is inclined, whether for an increased
audience or for pure journalistic value, to trumpet these fundamentalists offering radical, onesided beliefs and arguments. Therefore, on the television, in the newspapers, flowing through
the daily life of the sixteen million Dutch citizens is the constant collision of seemingly
uncompromising, unflinching, incompatible cultures. The debate has been framed as if one
culture, specifically the indigenous Dutch culture, must be forced upon the immigrants or
else radical Islam will do the same to the Dutch, taking over the country and extinguishing
the customs, the political beliefs and the cultural practices that have existed for centuries. It
has become a black and white fight, as if there are only two sides in the debate.
There needs to be a breath. There needs to be a pause in the bickering, a
contemplative silence from trying to out-shout, out-argue or control the others. Because of
the speed of immigration, the changing world events and the ebb and flow of economic and
social factors throughout the world, the immigration debate has become blind to nuance,
blind to the intricacies of the subject and especially blind to history. This paper, exploring the
Moluccan experience in the Netherlands and weaving it together with contemporary debate

41

seeks to take off these blinders and slow down the debate momentarily. It is imperative that
the Dutch learn from its own history and delve beneath the surface of issues, exploring the
reasons behind immigration difficulties. The story of the Moluccans in the Netherlands, the
history of the Dutch as a colonial empire and the evolution of individuals through new
generations in an immigrant population are three lines that are immensely important to
understand today better. While there are many important differences separating the story of
the Moluccans from the story of the Turks and the Moroccans, the striking similarities can
teach contemporary scholars and actually offer hope that, by using the right tools and
searching for a fair, compromise, there are actual moderate solutions that do not require
violence, reactionary politics or social turmoil.
The Moluccans, like the Turks and the Moroccans were originally thought to be
temporary. Thus, they were isolated, thought of as outsiders in this very small country. This
is the first point to learn from. It is both the government and the group’s responsibility to
realize that the first assumption about immigrants is often to believe that they are temporary.
However, this assumption can be dangerous and can set back integration for a long period of
time. While neither the Dutch government nor the Moluccan community can be blamed for
initially believing that the former KNIL soldiers and their families would return to the
Moluccas shortly, it is inexcusable that this thinking continued especially on a governmental
level for nineteen, and in some official documents, twenty-nine years. The steps that the
Dutch government took to integrate and welcome the Indo-European immigrants after the
end of the Dutch colony in Indonesia show that the country was not incapable of creating a
conducive environment for immigrants entering the Netherlands. However, there needed to
be a balance sooner, just as there should be a balance today, between the immigrant
community wanting to learn the language, some of their new home’s culture and the Dutch
government making it possible for the immigrants to both interact with indigenous local
people while still granting room for the group to keep cultural ties and important rituals.
This balance must also exist in the relationship that is forged. Clearly, when
immigrants come to a western nation, they will often lack certain tools to integrate. Some
may not have the desired education background, labor skills or language faculties. However,
the mindset that was forged in the days of colonialism that still exists in the Netherlands and
other western countries must be diminished. An immigrant group cannot be expected to truly

42

integrate or feel comfortable when the people are treated as an under-cultured or inferior
group of people. The fact that a Moroccan, a Turk or a Moluccan can never outgrow the
allochtoon moniker in the Netherlands, no matter how many generations live in this country,
is absurd. There is no way to completely erase race barriers, ethnic differences and feelings
of alienation and societal estrangement. However, the Dutch government, through the
schools, job placement programs and other governmental functions, should take special care
that these separations amongst groups of people is not apparent in official business.
Reminding children that they go to a zwarte scholen does not help them feel like they are a
part of Dutch society. Until 1983, the Moluccan wards and therefore all issues regarding
them as a group was under the control of the government and specifically the welfare section
of the government. It seems unfathomable that the Moluccans as a group would be expected
to become self-reliant and proud of their place in Dutch society when they were not trusted to
handle many personal affairs, such as housing, work and education, as most other Dutch
citizens do.
As long as there is a top-down approach to how the government approaches
immigrant groups, the latter will always be relegated to a second-class position, both in a
physical, economic sense and in a psychological sense. Taking control away from the group
and expecting the diverse individuals in that group to all act as one is counter-intuitive and
counter-effective. This remnant of the days when the Dutch ruled the homeland of the
Moluccans while other European countries much of the rest of the so-called third world must
end. There are ways to help immigrants get on their feet, welcome them into society and let
them become productive members of society without ensuring, through paternalistic political
practices, that the relationship is top-down and that the immigrants and their subsequent
generations feel powerless and unheard.
Terrorism is a horrible aspect of life in the contemporary west. It is never right.
Unfortunately in all the high-pitched discussion about terrorism today, people have forgotten
the lessons that can be learned from the story of the Moluccan second generation and the
small section of that group that radicalized and became violent. Terrorism does not emerge
from one religion, one political movement, one ethnic group or one doctrinal mindset. The
violence that erupts amongst marginalized young men and women is a result of complex
reasons. It is not a coincidence that there are striking similarities between the young people
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who became radicalized in the 1970s as part of the Moluccan independence movement and
those who have become violent today as part of radicalized Islam. These young people,
among the many reasons for their wrong-headed, tragic actions, often feel that they have no
voice in society. Especially for the “home grown terrorists” like Hansina Uktolseja and
Mohammed Bouyeri, they are disaffected in their own country. They do not feel like they
belong in the homes of their parents, the first generation, and they certainly do not feel like
they belong to the general Dutch society. They have experienced perceived wrongs against
themselves and their families and lash out in the one outlet that they feel, unfortunately, is
available to them. This final parallel presented in the paper is essential to understanding the
cyclical nature of immigration history in the Netherlands. More can be done to help young
people who feel trapped between the culture of their parents and their home country.
Violence can never be stopped. It was a wise and deep statement that one can never be onehundred percent safe from violence, nor can any government hope to peacefully and
democratically help and take care of all young men and women who lash out violently
against their government or at people around them. However, by fixing some of the
aforementioned problems, by stemming the isolation of immigrant groups and working with
people on an individual level rather than attempting to lump all people of the same ethnicity
together, the process of solving these problems can move forward.
The story of the Moluccans is not a closed book, nor are all the problems that the
community faces solved. However, it is a book that should be read and studied. The steps
that the community has taken and the struggle that has evolved into a more positive,
proactive one should serve as a blueprint for current and future immigrants to the
Netherlands. The study of immigration must be one that looks backwards and forwards
because past human interaction, past difficulties and past successes can always guide the
present and the future so that the difficulties can be avoided and the successes can be
embraced.
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Appendix 1.0
Statistics
A citizen with a “foreign background” is defined as “A person of whom at least one parent
was born abroad” and a “non-western foreign background” is defined as “A person of whom
at least one parent was born in Africa, South America, Asia and Turkey, excluding the Asian
nations of Japan and Indonesia.”
As of March 8, 2008
Total Dutch Population
Dutch Citizens with a Native Background

16,404,282
13,188,027
3,216,255

Dutch Citizens with a Foreign Background
Dutch Citizens with Non-Western
1,766,154
Background
Dutch Citizens with an Indonesian
387, 118
Background (includes ethnically Dutch
citizens who were born in Indonesia)
Dutch Citizens with a Moluccan Background 40,000
(estimated in 2002*)
Dutch Citizens with a Moluccan Background 45,000
(estimated in 2008^)
Dutch Citizens with a Turkish Background
372, 852
Dutch Citizens with a Moroccan Background 335, 208
* - Beets, G., Walhout, E. and Koesoebjono, S. (2002) 'Demografische ontwikkeling van de
Molukse bevolkingsgroep in Nederland; Maandstatistiek van de bevolking, 50(6): 13-17
^ - Interview with Wim Manuhutu, Director of the Maluku Museum in Utrecht
Religion 119
93% Protestant
Nationality in 1978
Appendix 1.1
60% - No nationality
4.5% Catholic
Moluccan Population in
(Statenloos)
2.5% Muslim
the Netherlands
30% - Netherlands
Origin in the
10% - Indonesian
Moluccas 120
Breakdown of arrivals
76% - Ambonese (Central
in 1951
Population in 1951
Moluccas)
6 clergymen
12,578
20% (est.) - Southern
3 adjutants
Population in 1957 (est.)
Moluccas (e.g. Kei and
35 sergeant-majors
18,600
Tanimbar)
372 sergeants
Population in 1968 (est.)
821 corporals
25, 456
119
2341 privates
Steenbrink, Karel. Colonial
Population in 1978 (est.)
9000 family members
and Post-Colonial Muslims
32,000
Population in 2002 (est.)
40,000

from Indonesia in the
Netherlands.
120
Bartels, Dieter. Can the
Train Ever be Stopped Again?
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